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INTRODUCTION 
At the outset, Pine Meadow Estates and Milt Farney, Appellants adopts all of the 
arguments set forth in the Initial Brief as though fully set forth herein. The Appellants 
maintain that the arguments set forth in their Initial Brief sufficiently address and refute the 
arguments set forth in Appellee's Response. However, Appellants believe that Appellee 
has misconstrued and obfuscated their arguments and the real issues in this case and 
therefore they submit this Reply Brief for the Courts consideration. 
There are a few preliminary issues worth addressing. Appellee has spent 
considerable time attempting to heighten this court's emotions and trepidation through 
brush strokes of imaginary totalitarian regimes and dark covert acts all of which simply lack 
factual foundation, are meant to skew this courts view, and are simply untrue. There is no 
evidence that Appellants nor any of the witnesses acted with malice or forethought, or in 
any manner which could be construed as cowardice or deceitful. Appellee's response is 
full of ad hominem attacks on the Appellants and the witnesses. Such attacks appear to 
be in clear violation of Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Appellants 
respectfully request that all such references be stricken from Appellee's Brief. 
Appellee asserts that Appellants failed to initiate legal proceedings to obtain some 
form of declaration for right of use over the Wilhelm road and that they were content to 
maintain the roads without permission, but the court record is void of evidence and no 
testimony was ever given that these acts were done by the Appellant nor any of the 
witnesses. Many of Appellee's assertions are unsupported by the factual evidence as 
required by rule 24(a)(7) and (e) and should be stricken from his brief. Furthermore, the 
fact that Appellants failed to bring this cause of action exhibits nothing, more than a 
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conviction that the road existed and a desire not to spend funds on costly litigation. 
Appellee knows that the road existed at the time he purchased the property and only after 
thirty years is now attempting to maximize the law and passage of time to remove a road 
at the cost of the developer. The road was reserved for the benefit and safety of the 
residents on the mountain. The facts were ample that a road existed prior to the Appellees 
purchase of the property and Defendant is attempting to capitalize on the fact that a road 
right-of-way was inadvertently overlooked and left off of the warranty deed when executed 
by Appellant Corporation. This error was simply an oversight wherein Appellant was 
dealing with hundreds of lots as so indicated by the various plat maps submitted into 
evidence. 
Appellees assertion that the testimony of the Defendant's witness was highly 
suspect is without merit as it should be noted and, as clearly set forth in the evidence, that 
not one of the individuals that testified lives in the upper subdivision for which the road is 
needed for fire protection, and thus their testimony did nothing for each other or 
themselves as they have no need to utilize the road. Each of these lot owners lives a 
significant distance from the disputed roadway, and one of the witnesses, Harry Moyer, 
had sold his cabin several years ago and does not own a lot within the subdivision. 
Another witness, Paul Fullmer, is a fire marshal on Cedar Mountain who has never owned 
a lot on the subdivision and has no vested property interest. Once again Appellees broad 
brush stroke of claiming that Appellants' witnesses were self-serving is simply a 
misconception, a tainted view of the landscape, as it were, for the sole purpose trying to 
induce this Court's sympathy. 
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The aerial photographs clearly and unequivocally demonstrate that a road existed 
across Appellee's property prior to Appellee's purchase of the same. It is Appellee who 
now seeks to utilize perceived legal loopholes and obscure the innocent acts of others, in 
an attempt to close a road which has existed for more than thirty years as testified by 
multiple witnesses and which was rebutted by Appellee alone-whose self-serving 
testimony was clearly contradictory to the evidence and areal photographs. It does not 
matter that the hand drawn depiction of the road on the plat map is not exact or that the 
width of the road has been increased over thirty years. The relevant factor is that vehicles, 
pedestrians, recreationalists, hunters, government employees and sightseers all utilized 
the road as desired without interference for significantly longer than the prescriptive period. 
The law is replete with the legislature's intent to permit the general public, including 
residents of the same subdivision, to assert the public road doctrine when the road has 
been available to the public for a period often uninterrupted years and to determine that 
the same has been abandoned for public use because of a land owner's failure to protect 
his interest in the property. It is not unethical, immoral, or un-American, but rather a 
logical, orderly manner whereby when the general public has utilized a road and relied on 
the same for a period of ten years it will be left open to the public, unless the landowner 
has manifested an intent to keep the road private by blocking or adequately intervening. 
The reality is that across the United State and the State of Utah the means by which many 
roads are established is through this process. As set forth in Appellants' Initial Brief and 
below, there are numerous cases that support this doctrine that the use of a road without 
interference for the prescriptive period vests the public's interest in the road. 
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POINT I 
APPELLANTS HAVE PROVEN BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE DISPUTED ROAD HAD 
BEEN ABANDONED TO PUBLIC USE BY THE WILHELMS 
FOR A CONTINUOUS TEN YEAR PERIOD 
Appellants have proven by clear and convincing evidence that disputed road had 
been abandoned to the public use by Appellee for a continuous period of ten years. 
Appellants first point out that each of the cases sighted by Appellee are cases wherein it 
was the person seeking to keep the road open that initiated the suit to establish a public 
road. Where Appellee sued to close the road, Appellant asserts that Appellee must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the road does not exist as a public road-a road 
which had been presumed by all to be a public road, including Kane County, whom initially 
issued Appellee a citation for blocking a public road. 
Nevertheless, presuming that this court will apply the clear and convincing evidence 
standard to Appellant, Appellant and more notably, Appellee, clearly provided clear and 
convincing that the road had been utilized for more than thirty years and that the 
blockages, if the court finds that any of the blockages occurred and were sufficient, were 
only two and no matter how the math is computed, there was a period of time wherein the 
general public utilized the road for ten years without interruption by Appellee. The only way 
this or any other court could conclude that there was not a ten-year uninterrupted period 
of use is to conclude that the blocking of the road by Garkane Power, a third-party wholly 
unrelated to Appellee, was legally sufficient to be a blockage of the road by Appellee. In 
other words, in order to conclude that there was not a ten-year uninterrupted period of use 
is to conclude that Garkane Power's temporary blockage of the road to insert buried power 
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lines was sufficient to manifest Appellee's intent to exclude others from the use of the road 
in question. 
Appellee cannot and should not be permitted to utilize a blockage by a third party 
who temporarily impeded traffic for an undefined period of time forthe purpose of trenching 
a power line through Appellee and other neighbors' property. This trenching does not give 
the requisite notice to the general public, and no testimony or demonstrative evidence was 
ever submitted that the Appellee took any action to block the road at the time of Garkane 
Power's commercial activities. No signs, or other additional methods were utilized by 
Plaintiff to claim a right or ownership of the road or to prevent traffic. By virtue of the fact 
that Garkane's blockage cannot be utilized by Appellee, the court in its own findings found 
that there was usage of the road for a ten-year period although the use was sporadic in the 
early times. (See Finding of Fact 35,37) Because the court found that individuals used 
the road who were not adjoining property owners, the court found that use of the road had 
occurred forthe requisite ten year period of time and but forthe courts error in accepting 
Garkane Power's blockage of the road as a valid blocking, and that neighboring land 
owners in the subdivision could not establish that the road was being utilized by the general 
public, the prerequisite ten year period was established. 
Appellee asserts that he never intended to abandon the road to the general public 
and the same was never proven by clear and convincing evidence as is so stated by Judge 
Mclff. However, it is not clearly outlined in Judge Mclffs Memorandum Decision because 
paragraph 44 of the Findings of Fact is actually a Conclusion of Law. What is clear, 
however, is that Judge Mclff included the blocking of the road by Garkane Power as a 
legitimate notice to the public. The only actual notice was that this blocking was so that 
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a utility line could be placed in the ground to service the cabins by some commercial entity 
and not that Appellee was intending to block the road. Appellee cannot reach back by his 
boot straps and pull himself forward in time by claiming that this blockage was one of the 
times in which he intended to assert his private use. It does not and cannot qualify for 
failure to give the prerequisite notice. 
Since Appellee admittedly failed to properly challenge use of the roadway prior to 
1980, his right to seek redress of the property invasion is permanently lost. The use was 
open and continuously adverse, and was utilized by the general public as testified by 
numerous witnesses and completely unrebutted by Appellees. Furthermore, Appellee 
never admitted that said use was permissive and in fact firmly asserted that all of the use 
was adverse. Appellant's unrebutted evidence includes: 
1. The aerial pictures clearly show that the road existed; 
2. Six individuals testified that they utilized the road during the thirty years in 
question on a daily basis; 
3. None of the witnesses who testified were adjoining property owners who 
needed the road to access their property; and 
4. None of the witnesses had a vested interest in seeing the road open for 
personal gain. 
What more evidence could Appellants have presented that the road existed unblocked for 
a ten-year period and was utilized to serve hunters, landowners, government workers, fire 
personnel, sightseers, strangers, developers, and a myriad of other persons who testified 
to have used the road and to having see others using the road? The only witness to testify 
for the Appellees was the Appellee himself. By his own admission, he was at the cabin 
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during minimal periods of time and therefore cannot and could not rebut the evidence of 
extensive use of the road by numerous people. Appellee was at the cabin a few days out 
of the year while the other witnesses resided on the mountain during the entire summer 
period. The fact that traffic increased over the period of time in the 1990's, as stated in 
Appellees brief, indicated that traffic was utilized during the entire period of the road's 
existence by the general public and that it was at an alarming increase in the 1990's that 
precipitated Appellees action's. Even Kane County believed that this road is a public road 
and had assumed the job of maintaining, grading, controlling, and regulating the road until 
this court's orders. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS DID NOT ASSERT THAT FORTY-SIX 
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Appellee asserts that Appellants have argued that all 46 of the trial court's Findings 
of Fact are clearly erroneous. This is simply not the case. Appellants have not argued that 
all the Findings and Fact are clearly erroneous, but that only a few of the Findings of Facts 
are clearly erroneous-as set forth in Appellant's brief (See PP. 18-26). Furthermore, 
Appellants are not required to prove that all Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous to 
support Appellants' assertion that some of the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law are 
incorrect. Appellants need only assert that those findings of facts which are incorrect 
materially led to incorrect Conclusions of Law. If so, then the matter is subject to review 
by this court and the trial Courts ruling is subject to reversal. 
The Court can set aside findings of fact in two types of circumstances. First, if the 
finding(s) is against the clearweight of the evidence (clearly erroneous). State v. C.A., 995 
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P.2d 17 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting In re J. A/, 960 P.2d 403,407 (Utah App. 1998)). 
Second, if this Court otherwise reaches a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made " Id. It is not possible to demonstrate to this Court that a finding is against 
the clear weight of the evidence or that a mistake has been made without setting forth 
evidence contrary to the finding. 
Some of Judge Mclffs Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous. Appellant is at a loss 
as of how the court could find that a road did not exist in some substantial condition prior 
to Appellee's purchase of the property by virtue of the photographs submitted into 
evidence. By comparison between the 1968 and 1977 photographs, it is abundantly clear 
that a road existed at the time Appellee purchased his property. Furthermore, although the 
court fails to adequately discuss this matter, the court obviously believed that the road was 
increased in size and width during the latter part of the 1980's and 1990's through use and 
by County maintenance. That may well have been so. But while the size and the scope 
of use of the road may have increased during thirty years, the fact that the road had been 
used by the public for thirty years clearly shows that the road existed for an uninterrupted 
ten-year period. Thus, for the court to find that Appellant's failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the road existed is clearly erroneous. Interestingly, the court 
stated at the close of trial that the direction the court was looking was how the road could 
be reduced in size back to "its prior use before the expansion preformed by the county 
while grading and expanding the road." The dilemma by both parties is that there is no 
statutory law governing the ability to reduce the expansion of a road wherein it gradually 
widens due to constant grading and improvements. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANTS DID NOT FAIL TO PROVE THAT THE TEN-
YEAR PUBLIC ROAD EXISTED WHICH PROCEEDED THE 
RECORDING OF THE STRAWBERRY VALLEY ESTATES, 
UNIT 2, PLAT. 
Judge Mclff ruled on the motion for summary judgment that Appellants could not 
present any evidence with regard to existence of a road prior to the issuance of the 
warranty deeds. This ruling was submitted without support of any legal authority which is 
reasonable considering the dearth of any case or statutory law addressing this issue. 
Appellants, therefore, did not prepare to provide evidence for trial to address this issue. 
Appellants were able to provide some evidence, although limited in nature, for 
impeachment purposes. 
Nevertheless, the trial court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment lacks 
logical reasoning as Appellants primary assertion has always been that the Wilhelm road 
was utilized as a public road. Section 72-5-104, Utah Code Annotated, states that "a 
highway shall be deemed to be dedicated and abandoned to the use of public when it has 
been continually used as a public road for a period often years." Nowhere in this language 
does it state that the road must be used a certain percentage of the time by a certain 
percentage or group of people, or that it excludes the person executing the deed from 
asserting the right or claim of a public road when challenged by Appellee. Furthermore, 
logic dictates that any person deeding real property to another which includes in that 
description an already recognized public thoroughfare would have no control or authority 
to deed away the public road. Likewise, a thoroughfare in the process of being acquired 
through abandonment would logically be tacked through its use by the public even though 
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the property has been transferred to a new owner. The rational is that a person does not 
own the property once it has been acquiesced to the public. The remedy is for the 
aggrieved party who has received the Warranty Deed to seek reimbursement from the 
issuer of the Deed. Such did not occur within the Statute of Limitations. Based upon the 
foregoing, Appellant was prevented from presenting evidence at the time of trial of the 
existence of the road because of the prior summary judgment ruling. 
Over the last twenty years, the Utah Supreme Court has determined that proper test 
of whether a roadway has been continuously used by members of the general public for 
at least ten years is the sole requirement for it to become a public road; it is not necessary 
to prove the owners intent to offer the road to the public. Thurman v. Byram 626 P.2d 447, 
449 (Utah 1981); see also Kohler v. Martin 916 P2.d 910 (Utah App. 1996) (ruling that 
when a roadway has been continuously used by the general public for a period of greater 
than ten years, it is impliedly dedicated to the public as a public highway). Nowhere in this 
case law does it state that the road has to be a freeway, a highway, or have twenty cars 
travel the road each day to deem it as a public road. The only requirement is that is has 
been used by the general public for a period greater than ten years. Judge Mclff in his own 
findings stated that "the old unimproved roads (before platting) did not reach the status of 
the public thoroughfare." R.315. 
Based upon inference from the trial court's statement, Judge Mclff obviously 
believed the existence of a road and that the road was in a much less improved condition 
than it was prior to the development by Strawberry Estates Unit 2. This statement is 
consistent with the witnesses who testified that prior to their purchase of the lots, the road 
existed, and while not existing in the same condition as it was at the time Appellees filed 
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their lawsuit, the road existed and was traveled by the parties. Every party including 
Appellee admitted to utilizing all or part of the road and by reviewing the photographs, the 
road existed prior to the issuance of the deeds. The fact that the road was a two-lane track 
is irrelevant as to whether or not the general public as well as the government utilized the 
road. In sum, it is irrelevant that Plaintiff's deed failed to incorporate the road because the 
roadway was already a public roadway and once the roadway has been abandoned to the 
public, it no longer belongs to either grantor or grantee. 
POINT IV 
APPELLEE CANNOT RAISE ESTOPPEL ON APPEAL FOR 
THE FIRST TIME 
Appellant's estoppel theory is being raised for the first time on appeal. With limited 
exceptions, this Court's practice is to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time 
on appeal. See Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125,1128 n. 4 (Utah 1992); accord 
Ong Intl (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 n. 31 (Utah 1993); see also 
State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 654 n. 3 (Utah App.1997) (limited exceptions include 
plain error or exceptional circumstances). Appellee has not argued that any exceptional 
circumstances exist that would allow this Court to consider such an issue for the first time 
on appeal. Therefore, this Court should decline to consider Appellee's estoppel issue 
which is being raised for the first time on appeal. 
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POINT V 
JUDGE MCIFF'S OWN FINDINGS OF FACT, AS SET FORTH 
BY APPELLANT, ARE CONTRARY TO HIS LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS. 
Judge Mclff specifically found that the uses made by the disputed road were 
sporadic and limited. Appellee adeptly points out that Judge Mclff found that the 
Appellee's blocking efforts were not exhaustive, but neither was the amount of use. 
Moreover the use appears essentially to be by neighbors in the subdivision developed by 
Pine Meadows as opposed to members of the general public. This finding of fact cannot 
and does not logically support the conclusion that the road was not used by the general 
public. Who is the general public if not those living in the area? The finding that the road 
use was sporadic and limited does not negate the fact that it was utilized by the general 
public and by neighboring land owners. As stated in the statute, the elements as to 
establishment of a public road is that it be open to public use for a continuous period of not 
less than ten years. The amount of usage is not defined nor mandated. Therefore, the 
definition of continuous use is crucial in determination of whether the road was or has 
become a public road. The Utah Supreme Court in Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 
1984), specifically addressed the issue of "continuous use" in determining whether a 
prescriptive easement had attached to the property. The court stated the following: "a use 
need not be "regular" or "constant" in order to be "continuous." All that is necessary is that 
the use be as often as required by the nature of the use and the need of the claimant." Id. 
at 1064, citing Richard v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977). Each of the 
witnesses testified that they used the road whenever necessary or desirous and was never 
prevented from doing so prior to 1993. With the exception of an alleged personal contact 
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with unknown parties, Appellee admitted only preventing the general public from utilizing 
the road on three occasions over a thirty-year period, one of which was caused by 
Garkane Power. In Memmot v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), the court was faced 
with a set of facts similar to the situation before this court. In Memmot the Appellees 
erected a gate across the road in dispute and placed great reliance on the existence of the 
gate in showing that the road was not a public road because of the "break" it created in 
usage. The court looked at the history of the road and determined that "if the road was 
public before the gate was erected, the erection of the gate does not change the nature of 
the road" Id. at 753, citing Sullivan v. Condas 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954 (1930). The court 
in Memmot 642 P.2d 750, also took judicial notice as to the purpose of which the road was 
initially constructed. In its final determination, the court relied on what it determined 
"substantial" evidence that showed the road had been originally constructed under the 
protection of the federal statute on public lands by hands of "the public." Id. at 753. 
Testimony by a clearly disinterested party who is the fire chief of Cedar Mountain testified 
that the road had been used prior to 1967 by the Forest Service for purposed of access to 
Forest Property. Interesting enough, in Thurman, the premise of the case was one wherein 
the general public had utilized the road to access Forest Service property which was 
maintained by county crews for numerous years and the county had posted traffic signs 
at the end of the disputed road. Furthermore, the court found that while the appellees did 
block the road to facilitate the movement of sheep, they never adequately blocked the 
roads enough to warrant a disruption in use to give adequate notice. Once again herein 
lies the conflict between the Thurman court and Appellees assertion that the road was 
interrupted by Appellees through the trenching of a power line by Garkane Power, blocking 
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of the road by a car, and felling a tree. All three could be innocent acts of a person having 
car trouble or felling a tree for the purpose of clearing land. Simply put, notice in the 
present case was not adequate nor was the disruption of use sufficient to warrant a 
blocking on this or any of the other occasions. 
As set forth in Appellants' Initial Brief, there must be an actual interference with the 
claimants use by means of erecting physical obstacles which prevents the adverse use by 
the general public. It is not sufficient to attempt an interruption or to render the use less 
convenient. The obstruction must in fact interfere with claimants' usage. The alleged 
blockages never interfered with any of Appellants' witnesses' use of the road. Some of 
these witnesses used the road on a daily basis. Moreover, use of the land by the owner 
for the same purpose of the claimant does not constitute an interruption. Appellee asserts 
that he parked a car across the road to interrupt other individuals use of the road. The 
interruption must be open, notorious and in a claim of rights such as to manifest an 
intention to repossess the property and dispose the occupant, and be a challenge to his 
right and dominion. It must bear on its face an unequivocal intention to take possession. 
See Hammond v. Johnson 66 P.2d 894 (1937). Based upon the foregoing, the cumulative 
testimony of numerous witnesses, it is evident that Appellee never sufficiently provided 
notice under the Garkane Power interruption or any of the other blockages to adequately 
interrupt the usage of the road as a public road. The trial court, although vague, found as 
much when it found that the blockings were not exhausting by Appellee, that the use was 
ongoing although not extensive. See Findings of Fact fflj 37 & 38). The trial court never 
once found and the findings were void or lacking as to whether or not the use was 
continuous and ongoing through the entire period of Appellees ownership of the property. 
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The court inferentially found in paragraph 38 that the use was continuous and that the 
amount of the use had increased over the years. Because of the increased use in 1993, 
Appellees responded by installing steel posts with lock chain blocking access. 
POINT VI 
APPELLEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL 
Appellees allege that they are entitled to attorney fees based upon a frivolous 
appeal pursuant to Porco v. Porco 79 UAR 35, 752 P.2d 365. There is ample proof that 
problems exist with Judge Mclffs ruling, a ruling which is based neither upon undisputed 
facts or the law. There are several points which have never been ruled on in the State of 
Utah which are fact specific and determinative in this case. Namely: the preponderance 
of evidence required by a land owner who is essentially suing to quiet title on his property; 
and the preponderance of proof by the issuer of a warranty deed who does not represent 
the general public nor Kane County; the shifting of the burden of proof when a public entity 
has claimed and exhibited ownership of the road by maintenance of the same. 
Second, Judge Mclff ruled that all three of the blockages between 1970 or 1993 
were valid. Appellants assert that none of these blockages were adequate and especially 
the blockage caused by Garkane Power. None of the Blockages were performed in a 
manner which would give the general public notice of Appellees intent to impeded travel 
of the road. None of the blockages rise to the level of blockages that case law has 
deemed appropriate. 
18 
Third, Appellants are at loss of how the court can conclude that a road did not exist 
in its current condition prior to Appellees acquisition of the property when areal 
photographs clearly and distinctly show otherwise. 
Fourth, it would appear from the Findings of Fact that the trial court has ruled that 
neighboring property owners are not considered as the general public wherein Utah courts 
heretofore have determined that only adjoining property owners cannot assert the claim 
of public road doctrine. 
Fifth, there was unrebutted testimony that prior to 1966 the road in question had 
been utilized by Forest Service, Federal Employees, hunters, and other individuals to 
access Forest Service land. 
It is clearly apparent that the trial court ruled in contravention of applicable statutes 
and legal authority in the State of Utah, and based upon the foregoing, Appellants are left 
to wonder the basis upon which Appellee's request for attorneys fees are founded. This 
was obviously not a clear-cut case with determinative implications whereby the ruling was 
clear. The court, even at the end of the trial, discussed the possibility of keeping the road 
open with a much more limited use and condition, to wit, the condition of a road prior to the 
active grating and upkeep by Kane County. It was only after it appeared that there was no 
ability to limit the use of the road that the trial court chose to rule against its own Findings 
of Fact, and declare that usage did not comport to the public road doctrine. Appellant is 
thus left to ponder a request for attorney fees and can only assume the same was done 
on the basis of incompetency and a complete misunderstanding of the law, as an attempt 
to appease his client. 
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STATEMENT OF ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Appellants respectfully request oral argument in this matter and that this Court 
publish its decision in this matter. This matter involves numerous and important 
fundamental issues that could establish precedent to guide parties and courts in dealing 
with similar issues in the future. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse 
the ruling of the Sixth District Court and order that the road be reopened as a public road. 
DATED this day of May, 2001. 
JUSTIN W. WAYMENT 
BLAINE T. HOFELING 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
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